This paper examines the local determinacy implications of using consumption taxes and income taxes to finance a balanced budget fiscal policy for a variety of popular monetary policy rules. It is shown using a New Keynesian framework that the severity of the indeterminacy problem that arises under each tax system depends not only on the specification of the interestrate feedback rule, but also on the magnitude of the steady state tax rate, the steady state government debt-output ratio, and the degree of price stickiness. However, significant differences in the determinacy criteria across the two tax systems are found to exist. The robustness of the results are assessed by extending the baseline model to include capital accumulation and the taxation of bond interest income. From a policy perspective, our results suggest that future shifts towards indirect taxation could have non-trivial implications for the setting of monetary policy under balanced-budget rules, in particular the ability of the Taylor principle to achieve determinacy.
Introduction
How should the government finance its spending under a balanced budget fiscal policy? Recent real business cycle studies suggest that the tax system used to finance a balanced-budget rule can have important implications for macroeconomic stability. 1 This literature has shown that income taxation may induce multiple equilibria, or equilibrium indeterminacy, which can destabilize the economy through the emergence of expectations-driven fluctuations. In contrast, Giannitsarou (2007) finds that determinacy, or local equilibrium uniqueness, is easily induced under a balanced budget policy if the government raises revenue using consumption taxes rather than income taxes, as the former do not exert a destabilizing influence on the economy. An important omission in the above literature, however, is the notable absence of monetary policy from the determinacy analysis. As first highlighted by Leeper (1991) , the determinacy properties of a rational expectations equilibrium depend crucially on the assumed interactions between fiscal policy and monetary policy. If monetary policy is implemented in terms of an interest-rate feedback rule and the government uses lump-sum taxation to continuously balance its budget, there is now a large literature that explores the suitability of the Taylor principle in preventing indeterminacy of equilibrium. 2, 3 This paper investigates the conditions for determinacy under a balanced budget fiscal policy, by augmenting a standard New Keynesian sticky-price model to include distortionary income and consumption taxation. Its main aim is to use the criteria for equilibrium determinacy to compare each tax system under alternative monetary policy specifications. It is assumed throughout that both tax systems are proportional, and that the government can only employ one of the two taxes to raise revenue to finance a fixed level of unproductive spending. Monetary policy is characterized by either a forward-looking or contemporaneous-looking interest-rate feedback rule that responds to inflation and output. It is shown that the necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy are not equivalent across the two tax systems and this can have important implications on the effectiveness of the Taylor principle in preventing indeterminacy. 4 To understand why differences in the determinacy criteria arise, consider how each tax system affects aggregate demand and aggregate supply in response to changes in the real interest rate.
Under both consumption and income taxation, movements in the real interest rate induce changes in aggregate supply through a public finance channel of monetary policy: higher real interest rates imply larger government debt repayments and higher taxes to balance the budget, which exert upward pressure on real marginal cost and consequently inflation. However, under consumption taxation fiscal policy can additionally influence the economy via an aggregate demand channel:
expected changes in the consumption tax rate that arise from the public finance channel, induce changes in the after-tax real interest rate, which directly affects aggregate demand via the consumption Euler equation.
Our main results are as follows. First, if the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate in response solely to future inflation (i.e. a strict future inflation targeting policy), we find that under income taxation the Taylor principle easily renders the equilibrium indeterminate, and the problem of indeterminacy cannot be ameliorated by the incorporation of future output into the feedback rule (i.e. a flexible future inflation targeting policy). The severity of the indeterminacy problem is shown to be increasing in the steady state tax rate and the steady state governmentdebt ratio, and decreasing in the degree of price stickiness. In stark contrast, the Taylor principle always generates determinacy under consumption taxation.
Second, we find for a strict contemporaneous inflation targeting policy that the range of determinacy increases significantly under income taxation, and indeterminacy can easily be ameliorated if the feedback rule also responds to current output. While determinacy is also possible under consumption taxation, now the Taylor principle can additionally result in an explosive equilibrium, which is more likely to occur the greater is the steady state government debt-output ratio and the lower the degree of price stickiness. Moreover, a flexible contemporaneous inflation targeting policy exacerbates the problem of explosiveness: the larger the weight assigned to output in the interestrate feedback rule, the greater the area of explosiveness associated with the Taylor principle. In this case, a passive monetary policy is shown to be appropriate for inducing determinacy.
The robustness of the above results are explored by modifying the baseline model to include either the taxation of bond interest income or capital and investment spending. When bond interest income is also subject to income taxation, the after-tax nominal interest rate enters the consumption Euler equation. This is shown to have two implications for determinacy. Similar to Edge and Rudd (2007) , the lower bound on the inflation response coefficient needs to be greater than what the Taylor principle prescribes, in order for increases in the after-tax nominal interest rate to result in a real interest rate increase. In addition, expected changes in the income tax rate that arise from the public finance channel, now also directly affect aggregate demand. However, unlike consumption taxation this aggregate demand channel is found to be weak. Consequently, the conclusions of the baseline model remain qualitatively unchanged. When capital accumulation is incorporated into the model, the severity of the indeterminacy problem under both tax systems is shown to be increasing in the degree of price stickiness and decreasing in the steady state government debt-output ratio. For a strict contemporaneous inflation targeting policy, the numerical exercise finds that the region of indeterminacy is always relatively larger under consumption taxation than income taxation. However, indeterminacy is easily preventable under both tax systems if the feedback rule also reacts to current output.
In many countries, there has been a shift away from direct taxation towards indirect taxation. The current paper is related to a small literature that has been exploring the determinacy implications of different monetary and fiscal policies under distortionary taxation (see Benhabib and Eusepi, 2005; Linnemann, 2006; Kurozumi, 2010) . 5 Previous studies have focused exclusively on the determinacy consequences of income taxation. Linnemann (2006) investigates the determinacy implications of income taxation under a strict future inflation targeting policy and shows that the Taylor principle cannot prevent indeterminacy under a balanced-budget rule. Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) find that indeterminacy can also arise under a current-looking interest-rate rule.
Furthermore, they show that if the monetary policy rule additionally reacts to output, this can help in ameliorating the indeterminacy problem associated with a balanced budget fiscal policy. Kurozumi (2010) considers the determinacy implications when the monetary policy rule is designed to respond to forward-looking inflation and contemporaneous output. He finds that the conclusions of Linnemann (2006) can be overturned if seignorage revenues enter the government budget constraint. 6 The contribution of the paper to this literature is twofold. We make a first attempt at investigating the determinacy implications of consumption taxes with the aim of providing a direct comparison between direct and indirect taxation. Second, we additionally focus on a variety of popular interest-rate rules that respond to both inflation and output, which are implementable and empirically motivated, and hence should be of greatest interest to policymakers. This is important, since we find examples where reacting to output in the interest-rate feedback rule can both be beneficial and harmful for determinacy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 compares the determinacy implications of budget-balancing using consumption taxes and income taxes under both forward-looking and contemporaneous-looking specifications of the interest-rate feedback rule. Section 4 extends the baseline model to allow for the taxation of bond interest income and capital accumulation, and discusses some of the policy implications of the results.
Finally, Section 5 briefly concludes.
A Sticky Price Model with Distortionary Taxation
This section outlines the model. The economy is assumed to be cashless, where there exists a representative agent, a representative final good producer, a continuum of intermediate good producing firms that set prices according to Calvo (1983) , and a fiscal and monetary authority. The fiscal authority follows a balanced-budget rule and can raise revenue by taxing either consumption where differences in the determinacy criteria across the two tax systems were also found to exist. 6 As discussed by Kurozumi (2010) , if seignorage revenues are rebated to the representative household, then the standard monetary economy with separable preferences is equivalent to a cashless economy model. For analytically tractability we follow Benhabib and Eusepi (2005) and Linnemann (2006) and assume a cashless economy.
or income to finance a constant level of (unproductive) spending. Monetary policy is specified as a Taylor-type feedback rule in which the nominal interest rate is a function of both inflation and output. Since we are concerned with issues of local determinacy, the following discussion is limited to a deterministic framework.
Representative Agent
The representative agent is infinitely lived, and chooses consumption C and labor L to maximize discounted lifetime utility: 7
where the discount factor is 0 < β < 1, subject to the period budget constraint
The agent carries B t−1 holdings of nominal government bonds into period t, which pay the gross nominal interest rate R t−1 . During period t the agent supplies labor to the intermediate good producing firms, receiving real income from wages w t and real profits from the ownership of intermediate firms ϑ t . The government raises revenue, either by taxing consumption at a rate τ c t , or by levying a proportional income tax τ l t on the agent's total labor and profit income w t L t + ϑ t . 8
The agent's after-tax resources are then used to carry out bond trading B t and for final good consumption C t . The first-order conditions from the agent's maximization problem yields:
Equation (3) is the consumption Euler equation and equation (4) is the labor supply equation,
where the trade-off between labor and consumption is the relevant after-tax wage rate. Optimizing behavior implies that the budget constraint (2) holds with equality in each period and the appropriate transversality condition is satisfied. 7 As is standard in the literature, the utility function is assumed to be separable between consumption and leisure. Assuming a non-separable utility function could have important consequences for equilibrium determinacy, since tax-driven changes in labor supply would now also affect intertemporal consumption behavior. 8 As is standard in the literature, we initially assume that interest income received from maturing bonds is not subject to taxation. The determinacy implications of relaxing this assumption is investigated in Section 4 below.
Firms
Following Yun (1996) , the economy is comprised of a continuum of intermediate firms denoted
The final good Y t is produced under perfect competition using intermediate goods as inputs according to the following CES aggregation technology index:
where ε > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Letting p t (i) denote the price of good i, cost minimization yields the demand schedule
where the aggregate price index P t is given by:
Intermediate firms hire labor to produce output given a real wage rate w t . It is assumed that a firm of type i has a linear production technology:
Thus, given competitive prices of labor, cost minimization requires that
where mc t is real marginal cost.
Intermediate firms set prices according to Calvo (1983) , where in each period there is a constant probability 1 − ψ that a firm will be randomly selected to adjust its price, which is drawn independently of past history. A firm i, faced with resetting its price at time t, chooses p t (i) to maximize:
where β s X t,t+s = β s [u c (C t+s ) /u c (C t )](P t /P t+s )[(1 + τ c t )/(1 + τ c t+s )] is the discount factor. All firms that are given the opportunity to reset their price in period t, all behave in an identical manner. The first-order condition for this maximization problem is given by:
The optimal price set is a mark-up ε ε−1 over a weighted average of future real marginal costs, where the weight q t,t+s is given by:
The aggregate price level evolves according to:
Fiscal and Monetary Policy
The government purchases a fixed quantity G of the final good, which is financed by the issuing of new nominal debt B t and revenues from levying taxes, either on consumption τ c t C t or on real
Consequently, the government budget constraint is given by:
To close the model we need to specify a fiscal policy rule and an interest-rate feedback rule.
Following Linnemann (2006) and Kurozumi (2010) , we consider a balanced-budget rule, where the stock of real government debt is permanently fixed at its constant steady state level b:
Motivated by the studies of Clarida et al. (1999 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 and Orphanides (2001 Orphanides ( , 2004 , the monetary authority is assumed to adjust the nominal interest rate in response to changes in both inflation π t ≡ P t /P t−1 and output according to the rule
where µ π ≥ 0 is the inflation response coefficient, µ y ≥ 0 is the output response coefficient, and R = π/β > 1, π, and Y respectively denote the steady state nominal interest rate, inflation, and output. The Taylor principle is represented by µ π > 1, implying that the nominal interest rate rises proportionally more than the increase in inflation. We consider two different specifications for the interest-rate feedback rule. A contemporaneous-looking feedback rule (i.e. κ = 0), where the nominal interest rate reacts to both current inflation and output as first proposed by Taylor (1993) , and a forward-looking feedback rule (i.e. κ = 1), where the nominal interest rate reacts to expectations of future inflation and output. 9
Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Market clearing in the factor and final goods market requires that
Aggregating the production function (8) across intermediate firms yields
Equilibrium. Given the constant G and the initial conditions B t0−1 and d t0−1 , a perfect foresight equilibrium consists of a sequence of prices {w t , mc t , P t , P t , d t }, a sequence of allocations (ii) the optimality condition of intermediate firms (9), the price-setting rules (10) and (11), the aggregate production function (16) , and a law of motion for price dispersion; (iii) the government budget constraint (12), the balanced-budget rule (13) , and the monetary policy rule (14) ; (iv) the final goods market clears (15).
Linearized Model
In order to analyze the equilibrium dynamics of the model, a first-order Taylor approximation is taken around the steady state. In what follows, a variable X t denotes the percentage deviation of
where 0 < s c < 1 is the steady state consumption share in output, the linearized consumption Euler equation (3) is given by:
where σ ≡ −C −1 (u c /u cc ) > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.
Combining the linearized versions of (4), (9), (10), (11) , and (16) yields the AS equation: 10
where
> 0 is the real marginal cost elasticity of inflation, and 0 < ψ < 1 is the degree of price rigidity. Linearizing the government budget constraint (12) , the balanced-budget rule (13) , and the monetary policy rule (14) yields:
where s b > 0 is the steady state ratio of government debt to output. To summarize, for the income tax system we set τ c t+1 = τ c t = τ c = 0 in the linearized equations (17)- (21) , whereas for the consumption tax system we set τ l t = τ l = 0.
Parameterization
In order to illustrate the conditions for determinacy, the ensuing analysis uses the following baseline parameter values summarized in Table 2 . Parameter β is standard in the literature and ω is taken from Woodford (2003) . We follow the related determinacy studies of Benhabib and Eusepi (2005), 
Linnemann (2006) 
Consumption Taxation vs. Income Taxation
This section compares the determinacy implications of consumption taxes and income taxes under the baseline model. For both tax systems, the necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium determinacy are derived for two variants of the interest-rate feedback rule: a forward-looking specification, where the nominal interest rate is set contingent on future inflation and output, and a contemporaneous-looking specification.
Forward-Looking Interest-Rate Rules
We start by considering the consequences for determinacy if monetary policy is characterized by a forward-looking interest-rate rule.
Proposition 1. If the monetary authority follows a forward-looking interest-rate rule, the necessary and sufficient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy are:
A. Income Taxation
Case I:
Case II: The two strict inequalities opposite to (23) and (24) hold.
B. Consumption Taxation
Case II: The two strict inequalities opposite to (26) and (27) hold.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Income taxes. Proposition 1.A suggests that in the presence of government debt (i.e. s b > 0) indeterminacy is a serious problem when a balanced budget policy is financed using income taxation. To see this, first consider the case when the monetary authority adopts a strict future inflation targeting policy, whereby the interest-rate feedback rule (21) reacts only to future inflation (i.e., µ y = 0). 11 For all parameter values employed in the numerical analysis Λ l 1 > 0, and Case II of Proposition 1.A never applies. Hence, for determinacy, condition (23) requires that the Taylor principle is satisfied (i.e. µ π > 1), and conditions (22) and (24) simplify to:
The numerical analysis suggests that for s b > 0, Γ 1 < Γ 2 so that Γ 1 given in (28) above is the empirically relevant upper bound on the inflation response coefficient µ π . By inspection, this upper bound is independent of σ, and it is straightforward to verify that Γ 1 is increasing in the degree of price stickiness ∂Γ 1 /∂ψ > 0 and decreasing in both the debt level ∂Γ 1 /∂s b < 0 and the steady state tax rate ∂Γ 1 /∂τ l < 0. The numerical analysis finds that even with only a small degree of s b , the upper bound Γ 1 is of a magnitude to be likely to bind. For example, using the baseline parameter values and setting s b = 0.1, the interval of inflation response coefficients that induce determinacy are: 1 < µ π < 1.923 for τ l = 0.2, 1 < µ π < 1.807 for τ l = 0.3, and 1 < µ π < 1.692 for τ l = 0.4. This is in stark contrast to when government debt is absent from the model (i.e. s b = 0), where the upper bound Γ 1 no longer applies, and the upper bound Γ 2 given in (29) binds only for unrealistically high values of µ π . For instance, under the baseline parameter values the interval of inflation response coefficients that now induce determinacy is 1 < µ π < 40.43 for τ l = 0.2, 1 < µ π < 46.06 for τ l = 0.3, and 1 < µ π < 53.57 for τ l = 0.4. (21), in addition to reacting to future inflation, also reacts to future output (i.e. µ y > 0). Figure 2 depicts the areas of (in)determinacy for combinations of µ π and µ y setting τ l = 0. in inducing determinacy crucially depends on the magnitude of ψ: the lower is ψ, the less effective is such a monetary policy in preventing indeterminacy. 13 13 The sensitivity analysis shows that this result is robust to variations in τ l .
Consumption taxes. For the consumption tax system, Proposition 1.B outlines the conditions for determinacy under a forward-looking interest-rate rule. First note that Λ c 1 > 0 for all parameter values used in the numerical analysis. As before, let us first consider the case when the interestrate feedback rule reacts only to future inflation (i.e. µ y = 0). Then it is straightforward to verify that Λ c 2 > 0, ∀τ c under the baseline parameterization. Consequently, conditions (25) and (26) 
which by inspection is independent of the steady state tax rate τ c . The numerical analysis suggests that the upper bound Γ 3 given in (30) has little practical significance. For example, under the baseline parameterization the interval of inflation response coefficients that induce determinacy is 1 < µ π < 34.71 with s b = 0.1. Since Γ 3 is increasing in s b , determinacy is therefore easily attainable for any debt level. To get some intuition behind these results first suppose that the government raises revenue using income taxation. With µ π > 1 and µ y = 0, then an increase in inflationary expectations ↑ π t+1 can be validated through the public finance channel of monetary policy. Under a balanced budget fiscal policy, an increase in the real interest rate raises future government debt repayments and future taxation from (19) . Since taxes are distortionary, higher future income taxes ↑ τ l t+1 increase future marginal cost, which via the next-period AS equation (18), results in a self-fulfilling increase in ↑ π t+1 . The higher is the steady state tax rate τ l , the higher the government debt-output ratio s b , and the lower the degree of price stickiness ψ, the more severe the indeterminacy problem becomes.
The key difference under consumption taxation is that the public finance channel now also directly affects aggregate demand. By inspection of (17), higher future consumption taxes ↑ τ c t+1 shift consumption towards the present, thereby reducing future output. Consequently, the aggregate 0 0.5 supply effects of higher future inflation can now be offset by the reduction in future inflation generated via lower future aggregate demand. Therefore, under forward-looking interest-rate rules consumption taxation helps to prevent the emergence of self-fulfilling inflationary expectations.
Contemporaneous-Looking Interest-Rate Rules
How sensitive are the previous results in relation to the specification of the monetary policy rule?
Here we consider the determinacy implications of the two tax systems when the interest-rate feedback rule reacts to both current inflation and output. The Appendix proves the following.
Proposition 2. If the monetary authority follows a contemporaneous-looking interest-rate rule, the necessary and sufficient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy are:
A. Income Taxation
Case II: The two strict inequalities opposite to (31) and (32) hold.
B. Consumption Taxation
Case II: The two strict inequalities opposite to (34) and (35) hold.
where Consumption taxes. For the consumption tax system, we first illustrate Proposition 2.B using the baseline parameter values under a strict contemporaneous inflation targeting policy. Figure 6 shows Det. Det.
Det.
Indet.
Indet.
(iv) ψ = 0.85 
where Γ 4 is decreasing in µ y . Consequently, regardless of the magnitude of the steady state consumption tax rate, determinacy can only occur under a passive monetary policy in this case. What is the intuition behind these results? Recall that for forward-looking interest-rate rules indeterminacy arose under income taxation via the public finance channel of monetary policy.
However, under current-looking interest-rate rules indeterminacy now depends on the effect of the public finance channel, relative to the aggregate demand channel of monetary policy. Under the Taylor principle, an increase in inflationary expectations ↑ π t+1 increases current inflation ↑ π t and the real interest rate. Under a balanced budget policy, from (19) the increase in the real interest rate raises the debt repayments of the government, resulting in an increase in income taxation, marginal cost, and from the AS equation (18), upward pressure on ↑ π t . However, the increase in the real interest rate also reduces aggregate demand via (17) , which reduces marginal cost, exerting downward pressure on ↓ π t . Therefore, the initial inflationary expectations are selffulfilling only if the public finance channel, brought about by the need for higher tax revenues, outweighs the aggregate demand channel of monetary policy. Consequently, indeterminacy is less likely to arise under a strict contemporaneous inflation targeting policy. Indeed, indeterminacy can easily be ameliorated under income taxation if the interest-rate feedback rule also responds to current output, since this magnifies the aggregate demand response to interest rate changes.
A key difference between the two tax systems is that locally explosive equilibrium can emerge under consumption taxation. Recall that with consumption taxes the public finance channel also directly affects aggregate demand from the AD equation (17) 
Extensions
This section investigates the robustness of the results presented in Section 3 in two important directions. Section 4.1 first considers the determinacy implications of income taxation when the taxation of bond interest income is also permitted, whereas Section 4.2 introduces capital and investment spending into the analysis. In addition, Section 4.3 discusses some of the policy implications of the results.
Taxing Bond Interest Income
So far we have ignored bond interest income as a source of tax revenue for the government.
However, as originally shown by Edge and Rudd (2007) this can have important implications for determinacy. We now assume that the interest income received from maturing bonds is taxed at the same rate τ l as the agent's total labor and profit income w t L t + ϑ t . Hence, the individual and government period budget constraints are now given by:
Consequently, the future labor income tax rate τ l t+1 now enters into the consumption Euler equation:
.
The other features of the model remain unchanged from the baseline model of Section 2. The Appendix proves the following.
Proposition 3. If bond interest income is also subject to taxation, the necessary and sufficient conditions for local equilibrium determinacy under a forward-looking interest-rate rule are:
Case II: The two strict inequalities opposite to (41) and (42) hold.
To see the determinacy implications of taxing bond interest income, first consider the case of a strict future inflation targeting policy. For all parameter values employed in the numerical analysis where
The numerical analysis suggests that
Comparing the empirical relevant upper bound Γ BI 1 with Γ 1 of the baseline model given in (28) , the numerical analysis suggests that Γ 1 < Γ BI 1 . However, while taxing bond interest income increases the upper bound on µ π , the numerical analysis suggests that the lower bound Γ BI 3 > 1.
For example, Figure 9 illustrates the (in)determinacy regions for two alternative values of the steady state income tax rate τ l = 0.2, 0.4. Panels (i) and (ii) of Fig. 9 depict the (in)determinacy regions for combinations of µ π and s b setting ψ = 0.75, whereas panels (iii) and (iv) depict the regions for combinations of µ π and ψ setting s b = 2.0. By inspection of Fig. 9 , taxing bond interest income increases both the lower and upper bound on the inflation response coefficient, the net effect of which, is an expansion of the determinacy region relative to the baseline results illustrated in Fig. 1 . However, indeterminacy continues to be a serious problem under income taxation as the determinacy region still remains narrow.
We now briefly consider the determinacy implications if the interest-rate feedback rule also reacts to future output. Figure 10 illustrates the areas of (in)determinacy for combinations of µ π and µ y setting τ l = 0.3 for alternative debt levels s b = 1.0, 2.0, 3.0 and degrees of price stickiness ψ = 0.3, 0.5, 0.75, 0.85. Comparing Fig. 10 against the baseline results given in Fig. 2 , the lower and upper bound on µ π are relatively larger for each value of µ y when bond interest income is taxed. However, despite these differences the qualitative conclusions remain unchanged: the lower is ψ, the less effective is such a monetary policy in alleviating the indeterminacy problem under income taxation.
To understand these results, consider the linearized version of the Euler equation (39) after There are two differences between (44) and its baseline version (17) . First, the future income tax rate τ l t+1 enters into the Euler equation (44). Consequently, adjustments in the income tax rate now have direct implications for aggregate demand. Recall that indeterminacy arises under distortionary taxation via the public finance channel of monetary policy. In order for the government to balance its budget, increases in the real interest rate result in higher taxes, which exert upward pressure on real marginal cost and inflation. By taxing bond interest income, this increases the upper bound on µ π , since higher income taxes now reduce aggregate demand helping partially offset the increase in inflation. However, as highlighted by the numerical analysis and in stark contrast to consumption taxation, this aggregate demand effect is found to be small under income taxation.
Second, in the baseline version of the income tax model it is the nominal interest rate adjusted for inflation that influences aggregate demand (17) , whereas by also taxing bond interest income (44) it is the inflation adjusted after-tax nominal interest rate: (1 − βτ l ) R t − π t+1 . Therefore, the lower bound on the inflation response coefficient needs to be greater than what the Taylor principle prescribes, in order for increases in the after-tax nominal interest rate to result in increases in the real interest rate.
For completeness, Figure 11 illustrates the areas of (in)determinacy under a flexible contempo-raneous inflation targeting policy for alternative degrees of price stickiness ψ = 0.3, 0.5, 0.75, 0.85 setting τ l = 0.4 and s b = 3.0. Comparing Fig. 11 against the baseline results given in Fig. 5 , shows a reduction in the determinacy region in the presence of bond interest income taxation, since as discussed above, in order to prevent indeterminacy the lower bound on µ π is required to be larger relative to the baseline model. Furthermore, the aggregate demand effect now present with bond interest income taxation increases the additional indeterminacy region that arises under ψ = 0.75, 0.85. However, unlike consumption taxation locally explosive equilibrium do not emerge under income taxation.
In summary, the above analysis suggests that while taxing bond interest income has interesting implications for the determinacy conditions under income taxation, the general conclusions of Section 3 remain unaffected.
Introducing Capital and Investment Spending
We now introduce capital into the baseline model by assuming an economy-wide rental market for the capital stock. The changes are briefly outlined below.
Firms To produce output intermediate firms hire labor L and rent capital K from the representative household, given the real wage rate w t and the rental cost of capital rr t . A firm of type i now has the following production technology:
where the input share is 0 < α < 1. Given competitive prices of labor and capital, costminimization yields:
The price-setting problem of intermediate firms remains unchanged.
Households The representative household owns the capital stock K and makes all investment decisions I according to the following law of motion:
where 0 < δ < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital. The household period budget constraint (2) is now given by:
Consequently, there is an additional first-order condition for optimal household investment:
Noting that with capital real income is Y t = rr t K t + w t L t + ϑ t , the government period budget constraint (12) can be expressed as:
Finally, the market clearing condition (15) now becomes:
The complete linearized model is given by the following equations:
where 0 < s I < 1 is the steady state output share of investment. Equation (59) only considers a contemporaneous specification for the monetary policy rule, since it is well established that determinacy is almost impossible under forward-looking interest-rate rules. 20
The linearized model (52)-(59) can be reduced to a five-dimensional system:
. Since there are two predetermined variables, K t and R t−1 , determinacy requires that three eigenvalues lie outside the unit circle and two eigenvalues must lie inside the unit circle. As analytical results are not possible, a numerical investigation is carried out. Following Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008), we set the cost share of capital α = 0.33, the depreciation rate of capital δ = 0.025, and the steady state output share of investment s I = 0.3.
For the remaining parameters, we use the parameterization given in Table 2 .
To see the determinacy implications of allowing for capital and investment spending, first consider the case of a strict contemporaneous inflation targeting policy. Using the above parameterization, the numerical analysis suggests that the determinacy conditions are independent of the steady state tax rate τ c . Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the areas of (in)determinacy for combinations of the inflation response coefficient µ π and the degree of price stickiness ψ using two alternative values of the steady state income tax rate τ l = 0.2, 0.4. 
From equations (52) and (53), an increase in the real interest rate results in a rise in the rental cost of capital. This decreases the capital stock and output, which via lower consumption and leisure, increases the supply of labor. Consequently, with a larger tax base, income taxes do not need to rise as much as consumption taxes in order to balance the budget, suggesting a relatively weaker public finance channel under income taxation.
Finally, the numerical analysis finds that indeterminacy can easily be eliminated under both tax systems if the interest-rate feedback rule also reacts to output, as this magnifies the aggregate demand response to changes in the interest rate. For example, setting ψ = 0.85 and s b = 2.0, then indeterminacy is eliminated if µ y ≈ 0.032 for τ l = 0.2 and µ y ≈ 0.03 for τ c > 0. Since the aggregate demand channel is stronger under consumption taxation, the monetary authority can target output slightly less aggressively to prevent indeterminacy.
Policy Implications
To highlight some of the policy implications of the above results, a counterfactual exercise is now performed for the Euro area, which as discussed in the introduction is currently contemplating further tax reform in the direction of indirect taxation. Specifically, we consider the determinacy consequences of a revenue-neutral switch from income taxes to consumption taxes for four vari- Lipińska and von Thadden (2009), we set the degree of price stickiness ψ = 0.85, which implies an average price duration of 6.67 quarters. As discussed by Blattner and Margaritov (2010) , estimates of the inflation response coefficient µ π and the output response coefficient µ y for the Euro area 21 Setting s b = 2.64 implies a yearly steady state government debt-output ratio of 66% which is slightly higher than the 60% threshold expressed in the Maastricht Treaty. 22 In the presence of bond interest income taxation we set τ l = 0.2922 to keep G/Y unchanged. 23 See, for example, Smets and Wouters (2003). the Euro area suggests that at least in terms of macroeconomic stability, switching from income to consumption taxation could have potentially harmful repercussions.
Conclusions
This paper has examined how financing a balanced budget fiscal policy using different tax systems can alter the conditions for determinacy under a variety of popular interest-rate feedback rules.
The analysis has shown that indeterminacy can arise under both consumption and income taxation, the severity of which can depend on the magnitude of the steady state tax rate, the steady state government-debt output ratio, and the degree of price rigidity. However, importantly our analysis reveals that the determinacy criteria are not equivalent across the two tax systems. From a policy perspective, the findings from this paper suggest that future shifts away from income taxation towards consumption taxation could have non-trivial implications for how monetary policy should best be conducted under a balanced-budget fiscal rule in order to prevent macroeconomic instability.
